Offensive terrestre à Gaza

Tsahal a donc décidé de franchir le pas et de revenir à Gaza.

L'évacuation décidée il y a quelques années par Ariel Sharon aura donc été un échec : elle devait amener les Palestiniens à créer leur état, elle a amené le Hamas au pouvoir et ce dernier a préféré continuer sa politique de destruction d'Israël !!

Les milliers de roquettes qui se sont abattues , les attentats suicides, le refus des nazislamistes de comprendre que leur cause est indéfendable, mais aussi, hélas, le soutien d'une partie de l'opinion publique occidentale au Hamas ont donc contraint Israël à faire ce que l'Europe refuse de faire : le ménage !!

Triste de voir que depuis 60 ans, des milliards de dollars sont partis en fumée pour les Palestiniens sans que ceux-ci ne renoncent à leur volonté de détruire Israël. Oslo était un mirage, l'évacuation de Gaza n'a pas apporté la sécurité, les négociations n'étaient qu'un jeu de dupe. Il ne restait plus que cette solution : éradiquer le Hamas !!

Tsahal se lance dans une aventure risquée, dangereuse, qui sera forcément incomprise par des gouvernements munichards.

En attendant, posez vous cette question : qu'exigeriez vous de Sarkozy si des milliers de roquettes étaient lancées depuis la Belgique sur les départements du Nord ?

La vidéo ci dessous montre les préparatifs de l'entrée de Tsahal à Gaza

 

Comments

[willycat]

Et ça va finir quand cette affaire ?

[Sebaneau]

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1231167266396&pagename=JPArticle%2FShowFull Our World: Iran's Gazan diversion? Caroline Glick, THE JERUSALEM POST, 5 January 2009 Since the IDF commenced its ground operations in Gaza on Saturday night, I have been hungrily eyeing my hat. On Friday I argued that the Olmert-Livni-Barak government is following the same defeatist strategy in Gaza today that the Olmert-Livni-Peretz government followed in Lebanon two and a half years ago. In 2006, the government supported a cease-fire that empowered outside actors - in that case the UN and Europe - to enforce an arms embargo against Hizbullah and to act as Israel's surrogate in preventing Hizbullah from reasserting control over South Lebanon. In the event, as government critics like myself warned at the time, these outside actors have done nothing of the sort. The European commanded UNIFIL force in Lebanon has instead acted as a shield defending Hizbullah from Israel. Under UNIFIL's blind eye, Iran and Syria have tripled the size of Hizbullah's missile arsenal. And Hizbullah has taken full control over some 130 villages along the border. In a similar fashion, today the government is insisting on the establishment of an international monitoring force, comprised perhaps of Egyptian, Israeli, Fatah-affiliated Palestinian, American and European officials that will monitor Gaza's border with Egypt and somehow prevent weapons smuggling. Like the cease-fire deal in Lebanon, this plan does not foresee the toppling of the Hamas regime in Gaza or the destruction of its military capacity. It ignores the fact that similar, already existing, theoretically friendly monitoring forces - like the US-commanded Multi-National Force Observers in the Sinai - have done nothing to prevent or even keep tabs on weapons transfers to Hamas. STILL, IN spite of the government's continued diplomatic incompetence, there are reasons to think that Israel may emerge the perceived victor in the current campaign against Hamas (and I will be forced to eat my hat). The first is that Gaza is relatively easier to control as a battle space than Lebanon. Unlike the situation in Lebanon, IDF forces in Gaza have the ability to isolate Hamas from all outside assistance. The IDF's current siege of Gaza City, its control over northern Gaza, its naval quarantine of the coast and its bombardment and isolation of the border zone with Egypt could cause Hamas to sue for a cease-fire on less than victorious terms. Indeed, this may already be happening.  Hamas's leaders are reportedly hiding in hospitals - cynically using the sick as human shields.  And on Monday morning, Hamas's leadership in Damascus sent representatives  to their new arch-enemy Egypt  to begin discussing cease-fire terms. Taken together, these moves could indicate that Hamas is collapsing. But they could also indicate that Hamas is opting to fight another day  while assuming that Israel will agree to let it do so. THE SECOND reason that it is possible that Hamas may be defeated is because much to everyone's surprise, Iran may have decided to let Hamas lose. Here it is important to note that the war today, like the war in 2006, is a war between Israel and Iran. Like Hizbullah, Hamas is an Iranian proxy. And just as was the case in 2006, Iran was instrumental in inciting the current war. Iran prepared Hamas for this war. It used Hamas's six-month cease-fire with Israel  to double both the range and the size  of Hamas's missile arsenal. It trained Hamas's 20,000-man army for this war. And as the six months drew to a close,  Iran incited Hamas to attack. So too, in 2006, Iran incited Hamas to attack Israel. That war, now known as the Second Lebanon War, was actually a two-front war that began in Gaza.  Ordered by Iran,  it was Hamas that started the war when its forces (together with allied forces in Fatah), attacked the IDF position at Kerem Shalom on June 25, 2006  and kidnapped Cpl. Gilad Schalit.  Israel fought a limited war against Iran's Palestinian proxies in Gaza for 17 days  before the country's attention moved to the North after Hizbullah attacked an IDF position along the border  and abducted Eldad Regev and Ehud Goldwasser. Israel's leaders today  warn against a possible Hizbullah attack. In the North, municipalities are readying bomb shelters  and air raid sirens ahead  of such a possibility. Most of the IDF reservists called up over the weekend  are being sent to the North  ahead of a possible Hizbullah attack. But in contrast to the situation in 2006, today Iran seems to have little interest in expanding the war and so saving Hamas from military defeat and humiliation. Speaking on Hizbullah's Al Manar television network on Sunday, Saeed Jalili, the head of Iran's National Security Council, its chief nuclear negotiator and a close advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, essentially told Hamas that it is on its own. In his words,
"We believe that the great popular solidarity with the Palestinian people as expressed all over the world should reflect on the will of the Arab and Islamic countries and other countries that have an independent will so that these will move in a concerted, cooperative, and cohesive manner to draft a collective initiative that can achieve two main things as an inevitable first step. These are putting an immediate end to aggression and second breaking the siege and quickly securing humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza."
In other words, Iran's response to its great enemy's the war against its proxy is to suggest forming a commission. There are many possible explanations  for Iran's actions.
First there is the fact  that war is an expensive proposition  and Iran today is in trouble on that score. In the summer of 2006, oil cost nearly $80 a barrel. Today it is being traded at $46 a barrel. Iran revised its 2009 budget downward on Monday  based on the assumption that oil will average $37 a barrel in 2009. Over the past several months, Iran has been begging OPEC to cut back supply quotas to jack up the price of oil.  But, perhaps in the interest of weakening Iran,  Saudi Arabia has consistently refused Iran's requests. To date, OPEC's cutbacks in supply have been far too small to offset the decrease in demand. And the loss of billions in oil revenues may simply have priced Iran out of running a two-front terror war.

Then too, Washington-based Iran expert Michael Ledeen from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies argued on Monday  in his blog at Pajamas Media website  that Iran's apparent decision to sit this war out  may well be the result of the regime's weakness.  Its recent crackdown on dissidents - with the execution of nine people on Christmas Day - and the unleashing of regime supporters  in riots against the Egyptian, Jordanian, Saudi, Turkish and French embassies as well as the home of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi  lends to the conclusion  that the regime is worried about its own survival.  As Ledeen notes  Teheran may view another expensive terror war as a spark which could incite a popular revolution  or simply destabilize the country  ahead of June's scheduled presidential elections.

THERE IS also the possibility that Iran simply miscalculated. It believed that ahead of Israel's February 10 elections, the lame-duck Olmert-Livni-Barak government,  which was already traumatized by the 2006 war,  would opt not to fight.  This would have been a reasonable assumption. After all, in spite of Israel's sure knowledge last summer  that Hamas and Iran would use a cease-fire with Israel  to increase the size of Hamas's missile arsenal  and expand the range of its projectiles while building up its forces, the Olmert-Livni-Barak government  agreed to the cease-fire. And then, when Hamas announced that it would not extend the cease-fire past its December 19 deadline, Defense Minister Ehud Barak sent emissaries to Egypt to conduct "indirect" negotiations with Hamas in which Israel essentially begged the terror group to reconsider.
But then Israel responded with great force and Iran was left to make a decision. And for the moment at least, it appears that Iran has decided to let Hamas go down. As far as Iran is concerned,  even a Hamas defeat is not a terrible option. This view is likely encouraged by Israel's current suggested cease-fire.  After all, international monitors stationed along Gaza's borders  will not serve as an impediment to future Iranian moves  to rebuild Hamas.
ALAS, THERE is another possible explanation for Iran's apparent decision  to abandon a vassal it incited to open a war.  On Sunday, Iranian analyst Amir Taheri  reported the conclusions of a bipartisan French parliamentary report  on the status of Iran's nuclear program in Asharq Alawsat. The report, which was submitted to French President Nicolas Sarkozy late last month,  concluded that unless something changes,  Iran will have passed the nuclear threshold  by the end of 2009 and will become a nuclear power  no later than 2011. The report is notable because it is based entirely on open-sourced material  whose accuracy has been acknowledged by the Iranian regime. The report asserts that this year will be the world's final opportunity to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. And, as Taheri hints strongly, the only way of doing that effectively is by attacking Iran's nuclear installations. In light of this new report,  which contradicts earlier US intelligence assessments that claimed it would be years  before Iran is able to build nuclear weapons, it is possible that Iran ordered the current war in Gaza  for the same reason it launched its war in 2006:  to divert international attention away from its nuclear program. It is possible that Iran prefers to run down US President George W. Bush's last two weeks in office with the White House and the rest of the world focused on Gaza, than risk the chance that during these two weeks, the White House (or Israel) might read the French parliament's report and decide to do something about it. So too, its apparent decision not to have Hizbullah join in this round of fighting might have more to do with Iran's desire to preserve its Lebanese delivery systems for any nuclear devices than its desire to save pennies in a tight economy. And if this is the case, then even if Israel beats Hamas (and I eat my hat), we could still lose the larger war  by again having allowed Iran  to get us  to take our eyes away from the prize.

[Sebaneau]

Hamas Is In Desperate Straits: The Proof

[david]

Lapsus, je voulais dire les Palestiniens du Hamas. 

[tintin]

"Où pouvait on implanter un état juif si ce n'est sur la terre qui lui a donné naissance. "C'est toute la différence entre nous. Pour moi, un état basé sur une appartenance religieuse est une absurdité, même s'il est d'essence démocratique comme l'est l'état d'Israël.   "Votre idée d'un état laïc est séduisante ..." Je vous remercie de ce commentaire. Ensuite, vous dîtes que les palestiniens ne veulent pas vraiment vivre avec les juifs. Pourquoi dîtes-vous cela ? En Israël, il y a tout de même 20 % de musulmans.